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Respondent, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") submits its 
Respondent's Brief as follows: 
,. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Appellant, Patsy Wernecke appeals the Industrial Commission's Order on 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, entered on January 19, 2007 (CR, pp. 142-144). 
Appellant's primary contention is that the Commission erred in finding that Ms. 
Wernecke's earlier lump sum agreement with ISIF, entered February 8, 1994 ( CR, pp. 
8-15), precluded her from asserting additional liability against ISIF for total and 
permanent disability benefits in a Complaint filed by Ms. Wernecke against ISIF on April 
26, 2006. 
The facts in this matter are basically not in dispute and Respondent will not 
merely repeat the same factual matters set forth in Appellant's brief. However, ISIF 
would note and/or highlight some points in addition to those raised in the Statement of 
Facts submitted by Appellant. 
When Ms. Wernecke first brought a cause of action against ISIF with regard to 
her 1990 injury, she was represented by the same attorneys who assisted her in 
prosecuting the current suit against the ISIF. Further, in that first suit, Ms. Wernecke 
claimed that she was totally and permanently disabled, unable to work and that ISIF 
was liable for a portion of her worker's compensation benefits because of her pre-
existing permanent physical impairments and/or conditions. CR, p. 9. ISIF contested 
the issues of whether Ms. Wernecke was totally and permanently disabled, whether she 
had a permanent pre-existing physical impairment and whether the pre-existing 
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impairment combined with the latest industrial accident in order to cause Ms. 
Wernecke's disability. CR, p. 9. 
As these issues were being litigated, the parties, including Ms. Wernecke and her 
attorneys, determined that a lump sum settlement agreement was the best manner to 
resolve the claim. Wernecke agreed to a lump sum payment of $6,500 to resolve her 
claim. Since the inherent nature and purposes of the ISIF under the worker's 
compensation system is to provide benefits for workers who have become totally and 
permanently disabled as the result of the combination of a pre-existing permanent 
impairment and a subsequent industrial injury, it obviously may only be liable for the 
payment of total and permanent disability benefits one time per claimant (i.e., a claimant 
may not become totally and permanently disabled more than once). Thus, Wernecke's 
lump sum agreement with ISIF provided that the settlement was in consideration for 
"any and all claims that Claimant may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to 
every claim of whatever nature or kind . . . for benefits against the Fund under the 
Workers' Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. CR, p. 11. 
Wernecke's attorneys counseled her with regard to the meaning and import of 
the Agreement and duly advocated for the entry of the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement to the Idaho Industrial Commission. CR, p. 12. Wernecke also confirmed 
that she requested the Agreement, understood its contents and specifically understood 
that she was waiving the right to assert any future claims against ISIF. CR, p. 13. The 
parties further agreed to waive any right of appeal with regard to Wernecke's claim or to 
seek reconsideration of the award. CR, p. 13. The Industrial Commission reviewed the 
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Lump Sum Agreement and, after determining that it was in the best interests of all 
parties, including Ms. Wernecke, approved the Agreement. CR, p. 15. 
Notwithstanding the clear terms of the Agreement, Wernecke filed the current 
suit against ISIF on April 26, 2006. See Appendix, Exh. A. Wernecke claimed that, 
while working and cleaning tables for the school, she sustained injury to her right 
shoulder when the leg of a table she was moving fell off and the table dropped. Id. The 
injury allegedly occurred as Claimant caught the table and took its full weight. Id. 
Claimant asserts that her injuries and preexisting conditions, including chronic back 
pain, cholecystectomy, repair of patellar fracture right, bursectomy of prepatellar bursa 
left and neck fusion renders her totally and permanently disabled. 
II. 
ISSUES 
1. Does ISIF have authority under Idaho law to resolve its liability for total 
and permanent disability benefits through a lump sum settlement agreement? 
2. Does the February 8, 2006 lump sum agreement between the ISIF and 
Ms. Wernecke violate Idaho Code§ 72-318 or other applicable law? 
3. Is Wernecke's April 26, 2006 Complaint against ISIF asserting benefits for 
total and permanent disability barred pursuant to the doctrine of Res Judicata and/or 
Collateral Estoppal? 
4. Does Wernecke's prior acceptance of the February 8, 2006 lump sum 
agreement serve as a waiver and/or estop her from attempting to pursue further 
remedies against ISIF in this proceeding? 
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Ill. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing an appeal from the Industrial Commission, this Court will uphold the 
findings of the Commission if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence 
in the record. I.C. § 72-732; Lethrud v. State, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 
1070 (1995). Evidence is "substantial and competent" if a reasonable mind might 
accept such evidence as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion. Reiher v. 
American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 60, 878 P.2d 757, 759 (1994). In reviewing a 
decision from the Commission, all facts and inferences are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed before the Commission. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton 
Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d 312, 317 (1990). However, the Commission's 
conclusions of law are freely reviewed by the Court. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Davaz v. 
Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). 
The interpretation of a statute and contract is a question of law over which this 
Court exercises free review. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. #84, 142 
Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006); First Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 
787, 964 P.2d 654 (1998). Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel bars the re-
litigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation between the parties is likewise a 
question of law subject to free review. Smith v. U.S.R. V. Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 
795, 798, 118 P.3d 127, 131 (2005). 
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IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ISIF ls Vested with the Authority to Resolve Liability Claims against it 
through Settlement and Lump Sum Agreements 
One of Wernecke's initial arguments on appeal is that ISIF is not legally entitled 
to enter into agreements with claimants settling claims of permanent disability where 
ISIF denies liability for total disability payments. This contention is not in line with 
controlling law. Under Idaho Code § 72-324, ISIF's manager is granted the power to 
"make agreements, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, for 
compensation of injuries ... " 
Though Wernecke appears to argue that a compensation agreement under 
Idaho Code§ 72-111 may only be entered into between employers and an afflicted 
employee, such is contrary to established precedent. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 128 
Idaho 880, 920 P.2d 397 (1996) (any liable party and an injured employee are permitted 
to enter into a settlement with regard to compensation, but the agreement must be 
approved by the Commission). 
Wernecke's argument would essentially entail the ISIF being prevented from ever 
entering into any agreement with a claimant in order to discharge its liability. Clearly, 
such a result is not mandated by the Act or any provision of Idaho law. Further, in the 
last 28 years alone, the ISIF has entered into over 1,045 Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreements or other compensation agreements. CR, p. 6. 
Claimant's contention that ISIF may only enter into agreements with a claimant 
whom the ISIF acknowledges is totally and permanently disabled and which the 
agreement merely provides the method and structure for payment of benefits is 
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completely unsupportable by Idaho statutory or case law. The ISIF may clearly enter 
into settlement agreements to discharge its obligations under Idaho Code §72-332. 
B. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement between Wernecke and ISIF 
was not in Violation of Idaho Code§ 72-318 or§§ 72-332 
Wernecke has primarily opposed the Commission's Order on Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling on the basis that the 1994 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at 
issue is invalid under Idaho's worker's compensation law. Initially, ISIF would note the 
irony of Wernecke's counsel's position in this matter. Though counsel for Wenrecke 
piously argues that the 1994 Agreement was merely an unlawful attempt by the ISIF to 
avoid its obligations under Idaho law, it should be remembered that Wernecke, through 
the same counsel that has prosecuted this appeal, advanced the Agreement in question 
and advocated for its acceptance in front of the Commission in the earlier suit. Claimant 
received her consideration for the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and counsel took 
fees associated with the settlement. There is no contention in this matter that 
Wernecke was forced to sign the agreement, was not adequately represented by 
counsel or that she was never apprised of her rights and the full consequences of 
executing the settlement agreement. 
Now, after having accepted the benefits of the 1994 settlement, Wernecke 
contends that the Agreement was unlawful and that she was prejudiced and denied 
rights to compensation by agreeing to a settlement to which her counsel advanced 
during the initial litigation in this matter. ISIF would contend as an initial matter that 
such a position is contrary to the general dictates of fairness and substantial justice that 
should exist in these types of proceedings. Moreover, the principles of good faith and 
finality of results is clearly violated when a party advocates for the illegality of their own 
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agreements in an attempt to cure their own past mistakes or claim an advantage in 
future litigation. 
Beyond the issues of the proper interpretation of worker's compensation statutes 
and/or the application of collateral estoppal in this matter, ISIF implores this Court not to 
reward Wernecke's tactic of accepting the benefit of a settlement in connection with a 
worker's compensation claim while then later arguing for its illegality in an attempt to 
procure additional benefits from the ISIF. Otherwise, the policy of encouraging 
settlement of claims would be severely undermined, as parties would lack confidence in 
the finality of judgments based on Lump Sum Settlement Agreements and there would 
be legitimate concerns of never-ending litigation in worker's compensation proceedings. 
1. Idaho Code § 72-318 
Wernecke initially argues that the 1994 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement was 
an invalid agreement to waive rights to compensation under I.C. § 72-318(2). That 
statute provides that "[n]o agreement by an employee to waive his rights to 
compensation under this Act shall be valid." /.C. § 72-318(2). Certainly, no appellate 
case law could be found supporting the proposition that§ 72-318 prohibits the ISIF from 
resolving future claims for liability through a lump sum agreement. 
Wernecke attempts to support her position that the Agreement is invalid under § 
72-318 through the use of a recent Idaho Supreme Court case. See Emery v. J.R. 
Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 11 P.3d 92 (2005). In Emery, the Court found that a 
claimant's voluntary dismissal of a worker's compensation claim with prejudice does not 
constitute an invalid waiver to rights of compensation under I.C. § 72-318. The Court 
noted in dicta that the stipulation at issue did not relieve the employer for all injuries the 
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worker might suffer while employed at Simplot. Id. However, the Court did not state 
that an agreement, such as the one disputed in this case, would be presumptively 
violative of § 72-318. Further, the facts of this case differ in material respects even if 
Emery did have some application here. 
First, ISIF would note that the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that§ 72-
318 only prohibits an agreement by an employee to relieve an employer of an obligation 
that the employer has because of the workers' compensation laws. See Osick v. 
Public Employee Ret. Sys., 122 Idaho 457,461, 835 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1992); see also 
Burdick v. Thornton, 109 Idaho 869, 712 P.2d 570 (1985). From all of the case law 
interpreting I.C. §72-318, it appears clear that the statute is intended to prevent 
employers from advancing agreements with their employees, outside of the litigation 
process or unrelated to an actual compensation claim, that may limit an employee's 
rights under the Worker's Compensation Act. 
Cartainly, ISIF is not an employer and the statute does not address agreements 
between a claimant and ISIF. More importantly, as Emery and the other cases above 
make clear, the statute is not intended to regulate judgments made in connection with a 
settlement agreement in a litigation setting. If so, any lump sum settlement agreement 
in which a claimant settles his claim for less than full value claimed would be 
categorized as un unlawful waiver under I.C. § 72-318(2). 
To the extent§ 72-318 has any application in a litigation setting with regard to 
settlement agreements, its scope would clearly be limited to agreements involving the 
employee/claimant and its employer. Clearly, the purposes of the worker's 
compensation system would be thwarted if an employer could procure a waiver from its 
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employee from asserting a future suit for injury. A worker could suffer multiple industrial 
accidents while working for a certain employer and the nature of Idaho's worker's 
compensation system dictates that the same employer may be liable for separate 
injuries. Allowing an employer to bargain its way out of liability for future injury would be 
akin to allowing a tort defendant in a car accident case from procuring a release from 
the injured plaintiff relieving the defendant from liability for all future negligence for 
which the defendant may be responsible. Certainly, the principles of substantial justice . 
would never approve of such a result. 
However, Wernecke consistently misunderstands ISIF's role in the worker's 
compensation system, which leads her to misunderstand the legality of ISIF's attempts 
to limit multiple claims asserted against it by the same injured worker. According to 
Idaho Code § 72-332, liability against ISIF is implicated only under the following 
circumstances: 
(1) If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any 
cause or origin, incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational 
disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, and by reason 
of the combined effects of both the pre-existing impairment and the 
subsequent injury or occupational disease or by reason of the aggravation 
and acceleration of the pre-existing impairment suffers total and 
permanent disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment 
of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or 
occupational disease, including scheduled and unscheduled permanent 
disabilities, and the injured employee shall be compensated for the 
remainder of his income benefits out of the industrial special indemnity 
account. 
Thus, the ISIF is not liable in every worker's compensation case. Liability may be 
imposed upon the ISIF only where the claimant is asserting total and permanent 
disability because of the combination of a permanent pre-existing physical impairment 
and a new industrial injury. 
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The ISIF cannot, then, be subjected to multiple successful suits by the same 
claimant - an injured worker may only be classified as totally and permanently disabled 
once. Clearly, there would be no incentive or purpose in the ISIF settling a total and 
permanent disability claim if there was an opportunity for the claimant to continue 
asserting further total and permanent disability claims. It would not serve the interests 
of the worker's compensation system if ISIF were forced to fully litigate every total and 
permanent disability claim. Where the issue of the claimant's assertion of total and 
permanent disability is disputed, the parties should be able to reach settlement. 
However, the claimant should not be able to claim prejudice in being unable to argue 
their disabled status against the ISIF in a future proceeding. 
In this case, Wernecke accepted payment from ISIF under the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement in regards to a claim of total disability. It makes perfect sense 
that ISIF, as part of that Agreement, would endeavor to prevent Wernecke from 
asserting future claims for total disability when payment had already been made under 
such a claim. Further, there is little justification for the proposition that a worker should 
be able to assert benefits on a number of occasions for claiming total disability. 
2. Idaho Code § 72-332 
Wernecke next argues that the Agreement violates J.C. § 72-332 since it did not 
completely compensate her for total and permanent disability. This argument presumes 
that ISIF has no option in a worker's compensation proceeding to which it is a party 
other than to be found not liable for benefits or to pay its full share of benefits for a 
claimant's total and permanent disability. As noted above, the ISIF has the power and 
authority to resolve claims through settlement. To the extent Wernecke's argument in 
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this regard is directed to the contention that a payment for $6,500 did not adequately 
compensate her under § 72-332, the point should not be well taken. Indeed, the 
argument is a red herring in this matter. 
The ISIF's responsibility to compensate a claimant under§ 72-332 is contingent 
upon the Claimant providing proof that they are permanently and totally disabled. See 
Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 173 (1989). In the initial 
proceeding in this matter, Wernecke attempted to prove total disability and the ISIF 
opposed that classification. Instead of both sides presenting their proof to the 
Commission on the matter, the parties agreed to settle the claim. Thus, Wernecke was 
compensated for her claim of total disability. 
The fact that Wernecke now feels that the amount she received in the settlement 
did not adequately compensate her for her claim of total disability is immaterial to the 
analysis on appeal. ISIF has the statutory right to enter into agreements with claimants 
with regard to their disability claims and the Commission approved the agreement in 
regards to Wernecke, which became a final judgment when entered. Therefore, it is 
somewhat disingenuous for Wernecke to assert that ISIF has avoided its statutory 
mandate to compensate claimants who are found to be totally disabled by its actions in 
this matter. Wernecke was never found to be totally disabled and accepted settlement 
of her disability claim in a manner that is consistent with dictates of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. 
3. The Application of Idaho Code§§ 72-711, -718 Resolves the Issues 
Raised on Appeal 
A review of the proceedings in this matter demonstrates that Wernecke is not 
technically attacking the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement she voluntarily entered with 
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ISIF. Rather, Wernecke is ultimately taking issue with the final judgment entered by the 
Industrial Commission with regard to her 1990 worker's compensation complaint. See 
CR, p. 15. As Idaho Code§ 72-711 clearly provides, an agreement approved by the 
Commission "shall for all purposes be an award by the commission." See also Drake v. 
State, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.3d 397 (1996) (An approved agreement constitutes a final 
decision of the Commission). Thus, the issue in this case should not be framed as 
whether Wernecke entered into an invalid agreement waiving rights to compensation, 
but rather whether Wernecke may reopen the judgment of the Commission. 
When the Commission approved the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the 
Agreement merged into the judgment and the Agreement became the decision of the 
Commission on the matter. If Wernecke had any claim of prejudice or error, her remedy 
was to timely move to have the Commission reconsider the judgment, i.e., under Idaho 
Code § 72-718, and/or the use of applicable appeal procedures. Wernecke failed to 
utilize those procedures. Thus, the "decision of the Commission, in the absence of 
fraud, [was] final and conclusive ... " See Idaho Code § 72-718; see also Sadiku v. 
Aatronics, Inc., 128 P.3d 947, 142 Idaho 410 (2006). 
Clearly, Wernecke may not now seek to re-open the Commission's decision. In 
fact, Wernecke has not provided (nor could Respondent locate) any statutory or 
appellate authority supporting the proposition that this Court may re-open or reverse the 
Commission's February 8, 1994 Order of Approval and of Discharge Upon Lump Sum 
Payment (CR, p. 15) since Wernecke did not timely appeal that Order. On this basis 
alone, this Court should dismiss Wernecke's appeal. 
C. The Doctrines of Res Judicata / Collateral Etoppel Bar Wernecke's 
Current Suit against ISIF 
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Wernecke next asserts that she is not barred from asserting a new suit against 
ISIF in this matter since this proceeding arises out of a new injury, necessarily involving 
a new and separate claim and new facts, the merits of which were never decided by the 
prior agreement or adjudication. However, the doctrine of collateral estoppel clearly 
applies in this case to bar Wernecke's current suit, as the Commission conclusively 
decided on February 8, 1994 that Wernecke would not be able to assert any future 
. claim for liability against ISIF for total and permanent disability benefits. 
"Res judicata" is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue 
preclusion (collateral estoppel). "Under the principles of claim preclusion, a valid final 
judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar 
to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim." Hindmarsh v. 
Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Claim preclusion bars a subsequent 
action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims "relating to the 
same cause of action ... which might have been made." Id. Issue preclusion protects 
litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. Rodriguez v. 
Dep'tofCorr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). 
Separate tests are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue 
preclusion applies. See D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141,144,997 P.2d 602,605 
(2000). Five factors are required in order for issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of 
an issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier 
decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the 
earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually 
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decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior 
litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privily 
with a party to the litigation. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 63, 157 P.3d 
613, 618 (2007). 
Res judicata serves three fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the 
acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would 
follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the 
public interest in protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and 
(3) it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. 
Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 
257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983)). 
The doctrine of res judicata is recognized and applied in worker's compensation 
proceedings. See Idaho Code§ 72-718; see also Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3,896 
P.2d 329 (1995) (A compensation agreement approved by the Commission is res 
judicata with respect to matters actually determined by that agreement.) Further, 
Commission approval of a lump sum agreement constitutes a final judgment on the 
merits of a claim. Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 
P.2d 1207 (1997). 
Courts around the country have agreed that a claimant may properly release and 
waive future workman's compensation claims against a defendant in the course of a 
settlement agreement. See, e.g., Moore v. Campbell, Wyatt & Cannon Foundry, 142 
Mich. App. 363, 369 N.W.2d 904 (1985) (Claimant signed a broadly-worded redemption 
agreement releasing the employer and carrier from liability for any other injuries which 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 14 
may occur during his employment and, thus, four years later when claimant petitioned 
for benefits for silicosis, the court held that the petition was barred by the agreement); 
Gates Rubber Co. v. Cantrell, 678 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1996) (settlement agreement 
between the claimant and the employer releasing the employer from all future claims 
barred a later action for retaliatory discharge). 
In this case, Wernecke cannot argue that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
at issue was ambiguous or did not state her rights with regard to future suits against 
ISIF with particularity. Wernecke explicitly and fully discharged ISIF from liability from 
any and all claims forever, including claims related to a future injury/accident not related 
to those raised in the litigation from which the Agreement was based. Further, 
Wernecke fully understood that the agreement forever concluded and disposed of all 
claims of any kind that she may have had in the future against ISIF. The Commission, 
upon reviewing the Agreement to determine if it was in Wernecke's best interests, 
entered an order approving the settlement. 
It is immaterial to the collateral estoppel analysis in this case that Wernecke 
could have incurred a future injury which would involve a completely new set of facts. 
The issue to be estopped is not the future injury itself or the new set of facts or 
circumstances surrounding such injury. The issue is limited to Wernecke's ability to 
raise new claims of total disability against ISIF. There is little doubt that this issue was 
clearly decided in the earlier suit. 
Therefore, the issue of whether Wernecke was barred from ever bringing a claim 
against ISi F in regards to a future accident/injury was fully litigated and actually 
decided. The Order approving the settlement and discharging the parties of liability had 
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the effect of a final judgment on the merits. Wernecke is clearly barred from attempting 
to re-litigate this issue against ISIF in this action by attempting to assert claims for 
liability against ISi F in contravention of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
Similarly, the concept of res judicata (claim preclusion) bars Wernecke from 
attempting to assert ISIF's liability for a portion of her total and permanent disability 
payments in this proceeding. For claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are 
three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). 
Wernecke is attempting to once again litigate the same claim as in the prior suit -
her right to worker's compensation benefits against ISIF - when that claim was fully 
adjudicated and concluded with a final judgment barring Wernecke from asserting any 
future liability against the ISIF. In the prior adjudication, the effect of the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement was an adjudication of all worker's compensation claims that 
Wernecke had against ISIF at that time or may have had in the future. The Commission 
necessarily decided the issue of Claimant's rights to present and future worker's 
compensation benefits during that case when it approved the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement and dismissed the case. 
Wernecke cannot seek further relief under a claim for worker's compensation 
benefits in this action when that claim was completely extinguished and final judgment 
rendered in connection with the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement in 1994. That 
judgment acts as a bar to Wernecke's right to pursue the same claim - the right to 
recover worker's compensation benefits from ISIF as a result of an industrial accident -
in this proceeding. 
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D. Wernecke has Waived or should be Estopped from Asserting the 
Current Claim for Total and Permanent Disability Benefits against 
ISIF 
Wernecke attempts to avoid the application of the doctrine of waiver and 
estoppel in this matter by arguing that she made an ill-advised mistake in entering into 
the Lump Sum Agreement and that I.C. § 72-318(2) exists to prevent a claimant from 
mistakenly waiving their rights to worker's compensation benefits. However, neither 
argument is helpful to Wernecke.on appeal. 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Brand 5 Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 432 (1981 ). "It is a voluntary act 
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some 
right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have demanded and 
insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956). "Waiver 
arising out of conduct is in the nature of estoppel." Idaho Bank of Commerce v. 
Chastain, 86 Idaho 146, 383 P.2d 849 (1963). It is an equitable doctrine based upon 
fairness and justice and, in order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly 
appear, although it may be established by conduct. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning 
Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P .2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
Wernecke cannot reasonably argue that she was mistaken in entering into the 
Agreement at issue. She was represented and advised by counsel. Indeed, Wernecke 
fully advocated for the adoption of the Agreement in front of the Commission. The 
terms of the Agreement fully establish that Wernecke clearly, intentionally, voluntarily 
and knowingly waived her right to seek future benefits from ISIF. Further, as discussed 
above, I.C. § 72-318 cannot reasonably be interpreted as disallowing parties to a 
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worker's compensation suit from entering into settlement agreements barring a claimant 
from asserting any future claims against a defendant. 
Alternatively, there is a sufficient basis for the conclusion that Wernecke should 
be estopped from seeking benefits from ISIF in this suit. 
. . . The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of 
benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a 
right incons.istent with a position previously taken by him or her. The 
doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to 
maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of 
which he accepted a benefit. The act of the party against whom the 
estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or 
produced some disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the 
estoppel must have been induced to change his position. (internal 
citations omitted). 
Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 874 P.2d 520 (1994). The doctrine of quasi-
estoppel does not require a false representation. It is designed to prevent a party from 
imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by changing positions. 
Young v. Idaho Department of Law Enforcement, Alcohol Beverage Control 
Division, 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615 (Ct.App. 1993). "The doctrine of quasi-
estoppel may be invoked against a person asserting a right inconsistent with a position 
previously taken by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of 
the person seeking to apply the doctrine." (citation omitted). Young, 123 Idaho at 875. 
Clearly, Wernecke's complaint in this matter for payment of total and permanent 
disability benefits against ISIF asserts a position that is inconsistent with the position 
previously taken by Wernecke in the prior action with ISIF. Wernecke both knew and 
acknowledged that by signing the Agreement, she was releasing ISIF of any future 
claims which she may have had against the Fund. Now Wernecke has attempted to 
take the inconsistent position that the prior Agreement was unlawful and does not 
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operate to bar her current claim against ISIF. This position clearly prejudices and 
disadvantages ISIF, as well as defeats the fundamental fairness and purpose of the 
worker's compensation system. Wernecke gained the benefit of receiving the lump sum 
payment and it would be unconscionable to allow Wernecke to maintain the position 
that she may now assert claims against ISIF in contravention of her earlier position 
when signing the Agreement. 
E. Public Policy Considerations Actually Justify Dismissal of 
Wernecke's Appeal 
Wernecke's final argument on appeal is an impassioned plea that the Court 
should turn aside ISIF's attempt to "avoid its statutory obligation" under the worker's 
compensation system by contracting it away. However, Wernecke does not attempt to 
address the important public policy considerations of the Worker's Compensation laws 
which encourage the settlement of claims and the finality of judgments. 
Certainly, the settlement of claims may potentially involve a worker's· 
compensation claimant getting less than the full measure of benefits she might 
ultimately receive if the case were fully litigated. However, the fact that parties to such a 
proceeding may ultimately determine to resolve the matter through settlement should 
not lead one to the cynical conclusion that they have attempted to avoid statutory 
responsibilities or ignored the greater good of workers in the state of Idaho. The 
settlement of claims serves the good of the claimant, saves the expense of a drawn out 
proceeding and allows the worker's compensation system to work efficiently and to the 
best interests of all parties involved. 
Instead, Respondent would note the public policy concerns inherent in the 
position Wernecke has advanced in this matter. Wernecke accepted the benefit of the 
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Lump Sum Agreement at issue. She did not appeal the Commission's final order 
approving the settlement. Now Wernecke attempts to attack an order which she directly 
participated in advancing to the Commission. Perhaps Wernecke hopes that 
adjudication of her current claimed injuries against ISIF will result in a settlement 
equivalent of a 60% disability. Of course, under Wernecke's rationale, she would then 
be able to later attack to viability of that settlement and, if injured a third time, advocate 
for the entitlement of total and permanent disability benefits against ISIF a third time. 
Public policy supporting the finality of judgments should be upheld in this matter. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the Industrial Commission's Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
in this matter should be upheld. ISIF was fully within its statutory authority when it 
entered into a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement with Wernecke which also served to 
resolve any future claims of disability Wernecke may have raised against ISIF. Further, 
since Wernecke did not timely appeal the Commission's acceptance of that Agreement, 
there is no statutory or appellate authority allowing her to attack that final judgment in 
the context of this proceeding. Finally, res judicata, waiver, estoppel and public policy 
considerations support the dismissal of Wernecke's appeal. 
~ 
DATED this / / day of February 2008. 
By~ <Jw~ 
7Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE ~VICE . 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this// day of February, 2008, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by delivering the same to each 
of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated below, addressed as 
follows: 
Charles L. Graham lg] 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, PA D 
P.O. Box 9344 D 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 D 
Telephone: (208) 883-1505 
Facsimile: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Appellant 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
~~ ftir~ 
"~Mallea 
APPENDIX 
Exhibit A- 4/26/06 Complaint Ms. Wernecke filed.against ISIF 
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REC VEDBY 
ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. JUDICIAL DIVISION. P.O. BOX uno. BOISE, IDAHO 13720-8041 (~ IQ~ \FD,-
WORKERS" COMPENSATION APR 2 8 2006 :':::::!] ~ 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMMTY·. ~~L SPECIAL COMPLAINT AGAINST~ 
l~MTYFUND 
Q.AJMANT'S ANO AOORESS 
Patsy Wernecke, Box 236 
Fernwood ID 83830 
BIPt.O'tERSNAME ANO 
Charles L. Graham, PO Box 9344 
Moscow ID 83843 
QfllOYER'SATTORNEY'SNAt.EANOADDRESS 
St. Maries Joint School Dist. 
PO Box 384 St. Maries ID 8 
Mark T. Monson, PO Box 8456 
I.C. NUMBER OF CURRENT ct.AIM (NOT 
03-515254 
DATE OF NJI.RY 
10/8/02 
PO Box 83720 
NATURE ANO CAUSE OF PHYSICAL IMPARMENT PRE-EXISTINGCl.NW:NT INJURY OROOClFATIONALDISEASE 
Injury to cervical spine with 2-level fusion (low back condition). 
' STATEWHY vou BELIEVE lHAT THEa.AIMANT ISTOTALlY ANDPmMANB'ITLYWWW 
See attached 
DATE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I haraby oet1ify 1haton the ;JV day of /f p r ; I , 20 0 6 , I caused n be S8MKI a 1tUe and comK:t copy of 1he foregoing 
COmpfaintupon: 
Manager, ISIF PO Box 83720 via: personal seNice of pn>eess 
regularU.S. Mal Dept. of Administration Boise. Idaho &S720-7901 
Claimant's Name 
Patsy Wernecke vta: D 
Box 236 lXI 
Aci&RWOOd, LQ 83i3Q 
pen;onal seNice of J>rc)08$$ 
regular U.S. Mail 
Employer's Name 
St. Maries Joint Sch2g1- ~is&: fil 
PO Box 384, St. Maries ID 83861. 
personal service of pn,ces$ 
reguar U.S. Mail . 
Stnty's Name 
Address 
State Insurance Fund 
Po Box 83720 
~se ID 83720 
via: 0 · per90nal service of process 
IX) nigular U.S. Mail 
o I have not S8fWd a copy of the Complaint upon anyone. 
NOTICE: Pursuant to lhe provisions of Idaho Code 172-334. a notice or claim must first be filed with the 
Manager of ISIF not less than 60 days prior to the fiffng of a complaint against ISIF. 
You must attach a copy of Form IC 1001 Workers' Compensation Complaint. to this document. 
An Answer must be filed on Form IC 1003 within 21 days of service in order to avoid default. 
1C1002 (REY. 1101 l2004) 
Exhibit A 
A 
'li!IW 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMPLAINT AGAINST THE 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF) 
Patsy Wernecke 
State why you believe that the Claimant is totally and pennanently disabled: 
Claimant has a 5 pound lifting restriction with her right upper extremity ( dominant); 
sitting limitation of 20 minutes; T ABE scores of reading 6.4, math computation 3. 9, 
applied math 6.9, language 4.2, vocabulary 7.2, language mech 4.4, spelling 5.0. The 
combination of medical and non-medical factors render claimaint unemployable in the St. 
Maries labor market. 
